According to Monacelli (2009) , a standard New-Keynesian model augmented with credit frictions solves the outstanding challenge to generate a joint decline of durable and nondurable consumption during a monetary tightening. This paper shows that his success in generating positive comovement between durables and non-durables is solely due to assumptions about price-stickiness in the durable goods sector and that the introduction of credit frictions actually makes the comovement problem harder to solve.
Introduction
An undesirable feature of standard New-Keynesian models is that they tend to generate counterfactual comovements between durable and non-durable consumption. That is, following a contractionary monetary shock non-durable purchases decrease, but purchases of durables increase. In some cases, the expansion in the durable goods producing sector is so large that the monetary tightening has almost no e¤ect on total aggregate output.
As pointed out by Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007) , these predictions are in sharp contrast with the conventional wisdom and empirical evidence that especially durable consumption falls during a monetary tightening. 1 They also show that the comovement problem originates from the fact that in a standard representative agent model without …nancial frictions the shadow value of durables is quasi-constant. This means that the utility gain from additional durables is almost time-invariant, and the implication is that households only change their labor supply in response to changes in the real wage in units of durables. When producers of durables do not face any costs on price adjustment, they set their prices according to a constant markup over the nominal wage, which implies that the real wage in units of durables is constant. 23 It follows that total hours worked and, therefore, total output hardly responds to monetary shocks. At the same time, the relative price of durables decreases following a contractionary monetary shock, because durable prices are ‡exible and non-durable prices are not. This leads to a substitution from non-durable towards durable purchases, which creates the negative comovement. Barsky, House, and Kimball (2003) suggest that one reason why standard models have di¢ culties matching the empirical evidence could be that they assume frictionless …nancial 1 For empirical evidence on the e¤ects of monetary shocks on durable and non-durable consumption, see for example Bernanke and Gertler (1995) , Barsky, House, and Kimball (2003) , and Monacelli (2009) . 2 The literature typically focuses on the extreme case of completely ‡exible durable prices, when the comovement problem is most severe. According to Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007) , prices of new homes are arguably ‡exible because they are usually the outcomes of negotiations. Concerning categories of durables for which there exists empirical micro-level evidence on price-setting behavior, Bils and Klenow (2004) report a median price duration of only 2 months for new cars. 3 Labor is the only production input in the models considered in this paper, so nominal marginal costs equal the nominal wage. Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007) analyze models with productive capital and show that the comovement problem also arises in these models.
1 markets. After a monetary tightening credit constraints may become tighter, and a reduced ability to borrow then forces credit-constrained households to purchases less durables. Monacelli (2009) formalizes this argument by extending the standard model to feature credit-constrained impatient agents who borrow from patient agents who are not at a credit constraint. He shows that if one also allows for a moderate degree of price-stickiness in the durable goods producing sector, the model with credit frictions is able to generate a positive comovement between durables and non-durables.
This paper builds on the analysis in Monacelli (2009) and investigates how much the credit frictions contribute to solving the comovement problem, relative to assuming that prices of durable goods are somewhat sticky. By comparing the results of his model to a stripped-down version without credit frictions, it is shown that without credit frictions it is easier to generate positive comovement, that is, less stickiness of durable prices is needed. While it is the case that credit constrained households reduce their durable purchases after a monetary tightening, the other households increase their durable purchases so much that the response of aggregate durable purchases is more positive than in the standard model without credit frictions. In the special case of fully ‡exible durable prices, the addition of credit frictions leads to a positive response of total aggregate output to a monetary tightening, whereas the standard model without credit frictions predicts a ‡at response.
To understand why adding frictions in lending between households does not help to solve the comovement problem, it is important to keep in mind that the credit frictions typically considered in the literature do not eliminate equilibrium in the bond market. When aggregate borrowing by the credit-constrained households is reduced as a consequence of tighter credit constraints, then the bond market only remains in equilibrium if aggregate savings by the patient households decreases by the exact same amount. Since buying durables is an alternative way of saving, the patient households can avoid a large distortion of their intertemporal plans by purchasing more durables instead of saving trough bonds. This behavior undermines the seemingly straightforward intuition that introducing credit frictions helps to solve the comovement problem by generating a decrease in durable purchases by the credit-constrained households.
But why does the introduction of credit frictions make the comovement problem even more severe? Consider again the shadow value of durables. For savers (and borrowers who are not credit-constrained), the shadow value of durables is again nearly constant, because their optimality conditions are the same as in the model without credit frictions. In contrast, impatient households in the model with credit frictions face an increase in the shadow value of durables during a monetary tightening, because their credit-constraint becomes tighter and durables serve as collateral for borrowing. Thus, credit-constrained households have incentives to dampen the e¤ect of the reduced ability to borrow on their durable purchases, which they achieve by substituting away from non-durables and working more. This pushes down the response of aggregate non-durable consumption and pushes up the response of aggregate total output, relative to the model without credit frictions. As a consequence, the response of aggregate durable purchases is more positive than without credit frictions, so credit frictions make it more di¢ cult to generate positive comovement between durables and non-durables.
Two sticky-price models with consumer durables
Two New-Keynesian models with durable and non-durable consumption are analyzed. The …rst one replicates the model of Monacelli (2009) , which describes a standard sticky-price economy augmented with credit frictions. The second is the same model without credit frictions.
The model with credit frictions
The model features two types of households with di¤erent rates of time preference, that is, one group of households is more patient than the other. Because in equilibrium the impatient households borrow from patient households, they are referred to as borrowers and savers, respectively.
Borrowing by the impatient households is restricted by a collateral constraint, which guarantees the existence of a well-de…ned steady state. 4 The size of the total population is normalized to one and the fraction of borrowers is set equal to $.
4 Similar constraints are considered in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005) .
Borrowers. Impatient households discount utility by a factor . They maximize:
where U ( ) is a utility function depending on labor supply N t and a CES consumption basket X t , that consists of non-durable goods C t and the stock of durable goods D t :
Each period, the borrowers face the following constraints:
where P c;t is the price of non-durables, P d;t is the price of durables, I d;t is the amount of durable purchases, R t is the gross nominal interest rate, B t is the nominal amount of debt, and W t is the nominal wage. Equations (1) and (2) are the budget constraint and the evolution of the durable stock, respectively. The collateral constraint (3) states that the level of debt must be such that the amount that has to be repaid in the next period cannot exceed a fraction (1 ) of the expected value of the depreciated current durable stock one period ahead. Therefore, can be interpreted as a collateral requirement. It is assumed that the collateral constraint always binds. 5 Let t be de…ned as the ratio of the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint to the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint. The optimality conditions are:
where U n;t , U d;t and U c;t are the marginal utilities of leisure, durables and non-durables, respectively, q t P d;t Pc;t is the relative price of durables, and j;t P j;t P j;t 1 is gross in ‡ation in 5 It can be shown that the borrowing constraint is binding in the deterministic steady state, so that the borrowers will have a positive level of debt in the steady state. Unlike standard practice, this paper features an accuracy test to check the validity of the assumption that the constraint always binds. 4 sector j; with j 2 fnon-durables,durablesg. Equation (4) is the standard optimality condition for labor, which equates the marginal utility of leisure to the product of the real wage and the marginal utility of non-durable consumption. The right hand side of Equation (5) is the shadow value of durables, which is the sum of the immediate utility gain of an additional unit of durables, the discounted expected value of the undepreciated part of the durable next period and a term re ‡ecting the utility gain from the additional borrowing capacity. This last term is proportional to t , which measures the tightness of the borrowing constraint. At the optimum, the shadow value of durables must be equal to the marginal utility gain that is derived from buying q t non-durable goods. Equation (6) 
Pro…t maximization results in the following well-known equation for demand for intermediate goods:
with associated price index P j;t
Intermediate goods producers. Inputs for the …nal goods are supplied by intermediate goods producers. Producer i in sector j has the following production function:
where N j;t (i) denotes the amount of labor that is used by producer i in sector j. Since intermediate goods are slightly di¤erentiated, their producers have some price-setting power. Nominal pro…ts at period t are given by
where the last term is a quadratic cost of price adjustment. Intermediate goods …rms maximize pro…ts using the stochastic discount factor of the savers, i.e., they maximize
;t e U c;0
subject to their production function and the demand equation. For a symmetric equilibrium, the optimality conditions for the non-durable and durable sector can be written as
where w t W t =P c;t is the real wage in units of non-durables, and w t =q t is the real wage in units of durables. When prices are fully ‡exible, …rms set their prices according to a constant markup over nominal marginal costs, which is the nominal wage in this model. Thus, when prices of durables are fully ‡exible, i.e. when # d = 0, the real wage in units of durables w t =q t = W t =P d;t is constant and from Equation (11) it can be seen that it equals (" d 1) =" d .
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Market clearing conditions and monetary policy. Goods market clearing requires
Bond market clearing implies
Labor market clearing and the production functions give
The model is closed by the following monetary policy rule:
where e t = 1 c;t d;t is a composite in ‡ation index and R and e are the steady state levels of the nominal interest rate and the in ‡ation index, respectively. The monetary policy shock, " t , evolves according to
where u t iid and lies between zero and one.
The standard model without credit frictions
The model with credit frictions can be modi…ed to obtain the standard model by simply setting the fraction of borrowers $ equal to zero. In the absence of household heterogeneity, debt equals zero in equilibrium.
The comovement problem in the standard model
As explained by Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007) , the key property of the standard model driving the comovement problem is the quasi-constancy of the shadow value of durables. This means that households hardly care about the timing of their durable purchases. Recall that the shadow value of durables is the right hand side of the durable optimality condition (8) and note that this equation can be rewritten as follows:
The shadow value of durables is quasi-constant because the marginal utility of durables depends on the stock of durables variations, and variations in the ‡ow of durables generate only small variations in the stock. Also, the shadow value of durables depends for an important part on the marginal utility of durables in the distant future, which is even less a¤ected by temporary shocks. As a consequence of the near constancy of the shadow value of durables, the relative price of durables q t and the marginal utility of non-durable consumption e U c;t move in opposite directions. When prices of durables are ‡exible relative to prices of non-durables, the relative price of durables q t falls during a monetary tightening, creating more incentives for households to purchase durables. At the same time, the decrease in q t must be accompanied by an increase in the marginal utility of non-durables e U c;t , which is associated with a lower level of non-durable consumption.
More insight in the comovement problem can be obtained by considering the special case of fully ‡exible durable prices. In the absence of price adjustment costs, the optimal pricing equation for durable producers (11) reduces to
so the real wage in units of durables w t =q t is constant. As a consequence, total output is roughly una¤ected by monetary shocks. This follows from the labor optimality condition (7).
An alternative representation of this condition equates the marginal utility of leisure to the product of the real wage in units of durables w t =q t and the shadow value of durables, which equals q t e U c;t : e U n;t = w t q t q t e U c;t :
Given that the real wage in units of durables is constant and the shadow value of durables is quasi-constant, labor cannot move much either. The same must hold for total output, since labor is the only production input. Also, the relative durable price q t decreases after a monetary tightening, and the quasi-constancy of q t e U c;t then implies that with a standard utility 8 function, non-durable consumption also decreases. Since total output remains roughly constant, durable purchases must increase. Hence, durable purchases comove negatively with non-durable purchases. 6
Calibration and solution method
Both models are calibrated to a quarterly frequency and the calibration follows Monacelli (2009) .
Parameter values are shown in Table 1 . The utility functions of the borrowers and the savers take the following form:
where the parameter is set di¤erently for the borrower and the saver and it is calibrated to normalize labor supply to 1/3 in the steady state for each type of household. comovement between durables and non-durables is more easily generated without them. In addition, the model with credit frictions is shown to su¤er from a number of other problems. First consider the model with credit frictions. The top row shows the results for the case of fully ‡exible durable prices. The responses of durable and non-durable purchases display the comovement problem as reported in the literature. But while Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007) found that in their model without credit frictions total output remains almost constant after a monetary tightening, the model with credit friction even predicts an increase in total output, which is at odds with the typical decrease found in empirical studies. The IRFs in the bottom row correspond to four quarter durable price-stickiness, so in that case prices of durables and non-durables are equally sticky. For this calibration, both durable and non-durable purchases decrease, but the nominal interest rate moves in the wrong direction. The …gure also plots the 8 It is important to consider the nominal interest rate, because although increasing price stickiness in the durable goods sector is helpful in solving the comovement problem, it actually makes it more di¢ cult to generate a realistic response of the nominal interest rate, as shown by Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007) Second, the model predicts extremely large volatilities for durable purchases by the borrowers and savers. This can be seen from Figure 2 , which plots the IRFs of durable purchases by the savers in the economy and the borrowers in the economy, as well as the IRF of total durable purchases. While aggregate durable purchases falls by less than 0.75 percent, the savers increase their durable purchase by more than 29 percent, while durable purchases by the borrowers decrease by more than 57 percent! 11
Comparing the two models
Now consider the standard model. The IRFs in the top row show that in the ‡exible durable price case, the standard model also predicts a negative comovement between durable and nondurable purchases. Without credit frictions, however, total output remains constant instead of displaying the counterfactual increase after a monetary tightening. The IRFs for the case where durable prices are as sticky as non-durable prices are plotted in the bottom row, which show that the nominal interest rate moves in the wrong direction in the standard model as well. The …gure also shows that, for any level of durable price-stickiness, removing the credit frictions leads to a more negative response of non-durable purchases and a more positive response of durable purchases. With credit frictions it is, thus, more di¢ cult to generate positive comovement and one needs to rely on a larger degree of durable price-stickiness.
There are two drawbacks to the exercise described above. First, comparing the two models with the same values of # d may not be fair, because the responses of the nominal interest rate are similar, but not exactly the same. Second, the discussion has focussed on the contemporaneous responses to a monetary shock, while a more complete description of comovements would also include longer horizons. For these reasons, an alternative exercise is carried out. To address the …rst concern, for each of the two models separately, # d is set as high as possible, but under the restriction the model still predicts a non-negative response of the nominal interest rate. 12
To address the second concern, comovement between durable and non-durable purchases is measured as the cumulative product of their IRFs. 13 3.2 Why do credit frictions make the comovement problem more severe?
The idea behind introducing credit frictions to solve the comovement problem seems very intuitive. After a monetary tightening, the borrowing constraint becomes tighter, which forces borrowers to reduce both durable and non-durable of purchases. But this intuition is based on only one part of the model and ignores equilibrium aspects. In particular, when borrowing by the impatient households declines as a consequence of tighter credit constraints, equilibrium in the bond market requires that the patient households save less. Since buying durables is an alternative way to save resources, the patient households can be expected to increase their durable purchases as their savings decrease. A priori, it is therefore not obvious that frictions in lending between households contribute anything to generating a more negative response of aggregate durable purchases to a monetary tightening. In fact, the results in the previous subsection have shown that the decrease in durable purchases by the borrowers is washed away by an increase in durable purchases by the savers that is so large, that the response of aggregate durable purchases is even more positive than in the model without credit frictions.
The question arises whether this result is robust. That is, does the presence of credit frictions just make it harder to generate positive comovement for the chosen parameters, or is this a 1 2 This is achieved by setting # d consistent with 2.4 quarter durable price stickiness in the standard model and 2.2 quarters in the model with credit frictions. In each of the two models, the nominal interest rate then responds just positively in the period of the shock. 1 3 The properties of this measure of comovement are described in den Haan (2000). In particular, it corresponds to the covariance of the forecast errors of the model. result that one can expect for other calibrations and modi…ed versions of the model as well?
The purpose of this section is to argue that there are intuitive reasons for the result that credit frictions make it more di¢ cult to generate positive comovement and that one can expect this result to be true more generally.
It turns out that the di¤erences in dynamics predicted by the model with and without credit frictions can all be traced back to what happens to the shadow value of durables. De…ne V t as the shadow value of durables for the borrowers and rewrite their durable optimality condition (5) as
A tightening of the collateral constraint, re ‡ected by an increase in t ; will, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase in the shadow value of durables for the borrowers V t . 14 The intuition is that when the utility gain from additional borrowing increases, the shadow value of durables also increases because durables serve as collateral for loans. Recall that for households who are not creditconstrained the shadow value of durables e V t is quasi-constant. Appendix C shows that because this is the case in both the model with and without credit frictions, the introduction of credit frictions leaves the responses of prices, wages and the nominal interest rate nearly unchanged. 15 Given these preliminaries it can be shown that the introduction of credit frictions leads to (i) a more positive response of aggregate total output, (ii) a more negative response of aggregate nondurable consumption, implying (iii) a more positive response of aggregate durable consumption.
As borrowers have incentives to dampen the decrease in durable purchases after a tightening of the credit constraint, they will be inclined to work more and use the extra wage income to buy durables. This pushes down the response of aggregate output. Borrowers also have more incentives to substitute away from non-durables and buy durables instead, which leads to a 1 4 A monetary tightening also leads to an increase U d;t , wich pushes up Vt as well. However, this e¤ect is relatively small because variations in the stock of durables are small. Also, for su¢ ciently large levels of durable price stickiness, Et f d;t+1 g decreases, which could also o¤set the increase in t . But note that the real interest rate in units of durables is quasi-constant, so calibrations for which Et f d;t+1 g increases, are those for wich the nominal interest rate decreases. In our numerical results this e¤ect never dominates as Vt always increases. 1 5 Given that e Vt is quasi-constant, it is possible to construct a subsystem that is the same for both models and that only contains the in ‡ation rates, the relative price of durables, the real wage, the nominal interest rate and the monetary policy shock.
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larger decrease of aggregate non-durable consumption. A more positive response of aggregate durable purchases then follows from the aggregate resource constraint.
To make this point formally, it is useful to express aggregate total output and aggregate nondurable durables as functions of the shadow values of durables. First consider aggregate total output. Recall that the labor optimality conditions of the households imply that the marginal utility of leisure equals the product of the real wage in units of durables w t =q t and the shadow value of durables, i.e.
where and e were de…ned as positive-valued parameters that pin down the steady state levels of labor. For a given response of the real wage in units of durables, households supply more labor when their shadow value of durables is higher. To proceed, combine the above conditions with the labor market clearing condition (12) to express total aggregate output
It now becomes clear why in the special case of fully ‡exible durable prices, aggregate total output increases after a monetary tightening in the model with credit frictions. In this case, the real wage in units of durables w t =q t is constant because durable prices are set according to a constant markup over the nominal wage. Given that e V t remains roughly constant, total aggregate output almost perfectly follows the rise in the shadow value of the borrowers V t when a sudden monetary contraction takes place.
In the more general case with possibly sticky durable prices, Equation (15) both models, the e¤ect of credit frictions on the response of total aggregate output cannot be explained by a di¤erent response of the real wage in durables w t =q t . The e¤ect can also not be explained by e V t , as the shadow value of durables for households who are not credit-constrained is quasi-constant in both models. The only variable that can explain why introducing credit 14 frictions changes the response of total aggregate is the shadow value of durables for the creditconstrained households V t . In the wake of a monetary tightening, V t rises and shifts up the labor supply curve of the borrowers, which makes total output decrease less or even increase.
Similar logic can be applied to explain why introducing credit frictions lowers the response of aggregate non-durable consumption to a monetary tightening. The optimality conditions for durables (5) and (8) state that the shadow value of durables must be equal to the product of the relative price of durables q t and the marginal utility of non-durable consumption, that is,
This allows us to express aggregate non-durable consumption C agg t as a function of q t and the shadow values of durables:
After a monetary tightening, the relative durable price of durables q t decreases or, equivalently, the relative price of non-durables increases. Households who are not credit-constrained reduce their non-durable purchases proportionally. This is because the shock hardly a¤ects the utility they derive from owning extra durables, as e V t is roughly constant. So aside from the price change, there are no extra incentives or disincentives to buy non-durables. To the credit-constrained households however, there are reasons to substitute away from non-durables towards durables, which is re ‡ected by a rise in V t . Given that the response of the relative durable price q t is almost the same in both models, aggregate consumption must fall more in the model with credit frictions.
It is now straightforward to explain why adding credit frictions leads to a more positive response of aggregate durable purchases. When the response of total output is more positive after adding credit frictions, and non-durable consumption falls more, then the aggregate resource constraint can only remain satis…ed if production in the durable goods producing sector responds more positively. Consequently, if the problem is that durables and non-durables move in opposite 15 directions, then augmenting the model with credit frictions makes this problem even worse. 1617
Conclusion
The idea that frictions in consumer borrowing could lower the response of durable expenditures seems very sensible, and it would de…nitely work in a partial equilibrium model. In a general equilibrium model, however, the reduction in borrowing and durable purchases by the borrowers has consequences for the agents on other side on the other side of the bond market, i.e., the savers. If savers are not very di¤erent from borrowers, then a temporary reallocation of resources directly available to borrowers and savers fails to have important e¤ects on the dynamics of aggregate variables. So the success of introducing credit frictions to a general equilibrium model depends crucially on heterogeneity between borrowers and lenders.
In the model of Monacelli (2009) , borrowers are di¤erent from savers in the sense that their incentives to buy durables depend positively on the tightness of the credit constraint. This paper has demonstrated that it is exactly this feature that explains why his model has more di¢ culties in generating a negative response of durable purchases to a monetary tightening than the standard model without credit frictions.
Other modi…cations of the standard model seem more successful in solving the comovement puzzle. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006) show that adding frictions in lending from …rms to households helps to generate positive comovement between durables and non-durables, as does the introduction of sticky wages.
Appendix
A Adopting a more realistic monetary policy rule Following Monacelli (2009) , the benchmark results are generated under the assumption that monetary policy attaches no weight to in ‡ation in the durable goods sector. 18 In this appendix, the more realistic assumption is adopted that monetary policy responds to a composite index of in ‡ation in the durable and non-durable sectors. The weight attached to durable in ‡ation is chosen to re ‡ect the share of durable purchases in total expenditures in the steady state, that is, is set to 0:2. B Accuracy test Monacelli (2009) shows that the borrowing constraint binds in the steady state. Following standard practice in the literature, he assumes that the borrowing constraint always binds, so that the model can be solved using perturbation methods. This paper also follows this tradition.
However, the question arises whether the assumption of an always-binding constraint is correct That is, the accuracy test checks how often the constraint is not binding. 20 The test is carried out by implementing the following steps:
1. Solve the model using a perturbation method (e.g. log-linearization).
2. Using the solution found in step 1, run a simulation of the state variables, and index simulated variables by t = 1; ::::; T .
3. At each point in the simulation, shut o¤ the borrowing constraint by setting t equal to zero. In that case, the …rst order conditions of the borrowers can be rewritten to …nd expressions for non-durables, durables and labor:
from Equation (6) :
from Equation (5) :
from Equation (4) :
where the stars indicate that variables are calculated under the assumption that the constraint does not bind. The values of R t , q t ; and w t are calculated using the policy functions found in step 1. The policy functions from step 1 are also used to approximate the conditional expectations by Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
4. Calculate rel debt from the budget constraint, with real debt de…ned as b t B t =P c;t :
and again use the policy functions found in step 1 to calculate q t ; D t 1 ; R t 1 , b t 1 , t ; and w t .
5. Compare the level of debt in the absence of a binding borrowing constraint b t to b t ; where b t is the amount of debt chosen when the borrowing constraint always binds, which is calculated using the policy function found in step 1. If b t is lower than b t at some points in the simulation, then it can be concluded that the borrowing constraint is not always binding. I also investigate the consumption errors that arise from falsely assuming that the constraint binds, by comparing C t to C t and I d;t to I d;t at the points in the simulation where the constraint is found to be non-binding.
Running a simulation of the model requires further assumptions about the distribution of the innovations to the shocks. The assumption here is that they are normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation u , which is to be calibrated. With larger shocks, a non-binding constraint is a more likely outcome. The strategy followed here is to relate output volatility predicted by the model to output volatility in the data. Output volatility is estimated to be 0.0087 over the sample period 1988q1-2007q4. 21 To remain agnostic about the importance of monetary shocks, several values for the standard deviation of the monetary shocks are considered.
These values are chosen such that output volatility predicted by the model is a certain percentage of output volatility in the data, ranging from 10% to 100%.
Another factor that a¤ects the likelihood of the borrowing constraint to be non-binding, is the di¤erence between the discount factor of the savers and the discount factor of the borrowers . In the extreme case where the two types of households are equally patient, that is, when = , the borrowing constraint will never be binding as debt equals zero in equilibrium.
Thus, the closer the two discount factors are, the less likely it is that the borrowing constraint always binds. To investigate this issue quantitatively, I not only run the test with equal to its 2 1 The data series used for output is real GDP at a quarterly frequency, taken from the website of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The log of this series is detrended using the HP-…lter with = 1600. 20 benchmark value 0.98, but I also repeat the test with equal to 0.985 and 0.989. These values are very close to the discount factor of the savers , which is equal to 0.99 in all calibrations.
To evaluate accuracy, criteria are needed. First de…ne the variable I t , indicating whether the constraint is non-binding:
I t = 0 otherwise, and then de…ne the following criteria:
criterion 1 100
criterion 2 100
criterion 3 100
criterion 4 100
The …rst criterion is the percentage of the cases where the constraint is found to be non-binding.
The second, third, and fourth criteria are the average relative errors in the amount of debt, non-durable purchases, and durable purchases by the borrowers, respectively, conditional on the event of a non-binding borrowing constraint. (17) explicitly, one can use log-linear approximations. These can be obtained by simply adding the equations x 1;t = E t f c;t+1 C t+1 g and x 2;t = E t n q t+1 C t+1 o to the system solved in step 1. 23 Figure 6 plots the two conditional expectations calculated under both methods and suggests that di¤erences are small. Table 3 compares criterion 1, calculated with both procedures, and shows that with the direct log-linear approximation of the conditional expectations, the constraint is non-binding somewhat more often, but the conclusions about accuracy would be the same in all cases.
C Dynamics of prices and wages in the two models
This appendix shows that the introduction of credit frictions has only minor e¤ects on the responses of prices and wages to a monetary shock. The Euler equation of the savers and the de…nition of the relative price of durables can be rewritten as:
Log-linearizing these equations around a zero in ‡ation steady state gives:
where hatted variables denote log deviations from the steady state. The log-linearized versions the price setting equations (10) and (11), and the monetary policy rule (with only non-durable 2 3 I would like to thank Matteo Iacoviello for this idea.
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in ‡ation) are:
Since the shadow value of the unconstrained households is quasi-constant in both models, b e V t E t b e V t+1 will be roughly equal to zero. Ignoring this term leaves us with a dynamic system of 5 equations containing 5 endogenous variables, being b R t , b c;t , b d;t , b w t , and b q t , and the exogenous shock " t . Since this subsystem is found for both models, it follows that the responses of b w t , and b q t cannot be very di¤erent. Figure 5 shows numerically that the di¤erences in impulse responses generated by the two models for the real wage in units of durables w t =q t and the relative price of durables q t are indeed very small. Note: The test is based on a simulation of length 51000, starting from the steady state and with the …rst 1000 observations discarded. Price stickiness of durables is set to 2 quarters. The percentages in the second column denote how much output volatility is predicted by the model with only monetary shocks, relative to output volatility observed in the data. Criterion 1 is the percentage of the cases in which the constraint is non-binding. Criterion 2, 3, and 4 are, respectively, the average of the absolute percentage errors in the amount of real debt, non-durable purchases and durable purchases by the borrowers, conditional on the event of a non-binding borrowing constraint. Conditional expectations are approximated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 10 nodes. 
